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Abstract
We propose a method for face de-identification that en-
ables fully automatic video modification at high frame rates.
The goal is to maximally decorrelate the identity, while hav-
ing the perception (pose, illumination and expression) fixed.
We achieve this by a novel feed-forward encoder-decoder
network architecture that is conditioned on the high-level
representation of a person’s facial image. The network is
global, in the sense that it does not need to be retrained for
a given video or for a given identity, and it creates natural
looking image sequences with little distortion in time.
1. Introduction
In consumer image and video applications, the face has
a unique importance that stands out from all other objects.
For example, face recognition (detection followed by identi-
fication) is perhaps much more widely applicable than any
other object recognition (categorization, detection, or in-
stance identification) in consumer images. Similarly, putting
aside image processing operators that are applied to the en-
tire frame, face filters remain the most popular filters for
consumer video. Since face technology is both useful and
impactful, it also raises many ethical concerns. Face recog-
nition can lead to loss of privacy and face replacement tech-
nology may be misused to create misleading videos.
In this work, we focus on video de-identification, which is
a video filtering application that both requires a technological
leap over the current state-of-the-art, and is benign in nature.
This application requires the creation of a video of a similar
looking person, such that the perceived identity is changed.
This allows, for example, the user to leave a natural-looking
video message in a public forum in an anonymous way, that
would presumably prevent face recognition technology from
recognizing them.
Video de-identification is a challenging task. The video
needs to be modified in a seamless way, without causing
flickering or other visual artifacts and distortions, such that
the identity is changed, while all other factors remain identi-
cal, see Fig. 1. These factors include pose, expression, lip
Figure 1. De-identification video results demonstrated on a variety
of poses, expressions, illumination conditions and occlusions. Pairs
of the source frame (first row) and the output frame (second row)
are shown. The high-level features (e.g. nose, eyes, eyebrows
and mouth) are altered, while the pose, expression, lip articulation,
illumination, and skin tone are preserved.
positioning (for unaltered speech), occlusion, illumination
and shadow, and their dynamics.
In contrast to the literature methods, which are limited to
still images and often swap a given face with a dataset face,
our method handles video and generates de novo faces. Our
experiments show convincing performance for unconstrained
videos, producing natural looking videos. The person in the
rendered video has a similar appearance to the person in the
original video. However, a state-of-the-art face-recognition
network fails to identify the person. A similar experiment
shows that humans cannot identify the generated face, even
without time constraints.
Our results would not have been possible, without a host
of novelties. We introduce a novel encoder-decoder archi-
tecture, in which we concatenate to the latent space the
activations of the representation layer of a network trained
to perform face recognition. As far as we know, this is the
first time that a representation from an existing classifier
network is used to augment an autoencoder, which enables
the feed-forward treatment of new persons, unseen during
training. In addition, this is the first work to introduce a new
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Preserves expression - - - - - - - +
Preserves pose - + + - + - + +
Generates new faces - † - † + + + +
Demonstrated on video - - - - - - - +
Demonstrated on a diverse dataset - + - + - - - +
(gender, ethnicity, age, etc.)
Reference to a comparison with ours Fig. 7 Fig. 4 Fig. 8 Fig. 5, 14
Table 1. A comparison to the literature methods. The final row references comparison figures in this work. We compare to all methods that
provide reasonable quality images in their manuscript, under conditions that are favorable to previous work (we crop the input images from
the pdf files, except for the images received from the authors of [43, 44]). †The face is swapped with an average of a few dataset faces.
type of attractor-repeller perceptual loss term. This term
distinguishes between low- and mid-level perceptual terms,
and high-level ones. The former are used to tie the output
frame to the input video frame, while the latter is used to
distance the identity. In this novel architecture, the injection
of the representation to the latent space enables the network
to create an output that adheres to this complex criterion.
Another unique feature is that the network outputs both an
image and a mask, which are used, in tandem, to reconstruct
the output frame. The method is trained with a specific data
augmentation technique that encourages the mapping to be
semantic. Additional terms include reconstruction losses,
edge losses, and an adversarial loss.
2. Previous Work
Faces have been modeled by computer graphics systems
for a long time. In machine learning, faces have been one of
the key benchmarks for GAN-based generative models [9,
37, 40] since their inception. High resolution natural looking
faces were recently generated by training both the generator
and the discriminator of the GAN progressively, starting with
shallower networks and lower resolutions, and enlarging
them gradually [17].
Conditional generation of faces has been a key task in var-
ious unsupervised domain translation contributions, where
the task is to learn to map, e.g., a person without eyewear to
a person with eyeglasses, without seeing matching samples
from the two domains [20, 51, 1, 27]. For more distant do-
main mapping, such as mapping between a face image and
the matching computer graphics avatar, additional supervi-
sion in the form of a face descriptor network was used [45].
Our work uses these face descriptors, in order to distance the
identity of the output from that of the input.
As far as we know, our work is the first de-identification
work to present results on videos. In still images, several
methods have been previously suggested. Earlier work im-
plemented different types of image distortions for face de-
identification [33, 10], while more recent works rely on tech-
niques for selecting distant faces [41] or averaging/fusing
faces from pre-existing datasets [32, 16, 31]. The experi-
ments conducted by the aforementioned techniques are re-
stricted, in most cases, to low-resolution, black and white
results. Although it is possible to create eye-pleasing results,
they are not robust to different poses, illuminations and fa-
cial structures, making them inadequate for video generation.
The use of GANs for face de-identification has been sug-
gested [49]. However, the experiments were restricted to a
homogeneous dataset, with no apparent expression preser-
vation within the results. In the GAN-based methods of
[43, 44], face de-identification is employed for the related
task of person obfuscation. The work of [43] conditions the
output image based on both a blurred version of the input
and the extracted facial pose information. The follow-up
work [44] combines the GAN-based reconstruction with a
parametric face generation network. As both methods are
applied over full upper-body images, they result in low facial
resolution outputs of 64 × 64. These methods do not pre-
serve expressions, are unsuitable for video, and occasionally
provide unnatural outputs.
Tab. 1 provides a comparative view of the literature. The
current literature on de-identification often involves face
swapping (our method does not). Face swapping, i.e., the
replacement of a person’s face in an image with another
person’s face, has been an active research topic for some
time, starting with the influential work of [3, 2]. Recent
contributions have shown a great deal of robustness to the
source image, as well as for the properties of the image,
from which the target face is taken [19, 34]. While these
classical face swapping methods work in the pixel space and
copy the expression of the target image, recent deep-learning
based work swaps the identity, while maintaining the other
aspects of the source image [23]. In comparison to our work,
[23] requires training a new network for every target person,
the transferred expression does not show subtleties (which
would be critical, e.g., for a speaking person), and the results
are not as natural as ours. These limitations are probably a
result of capturing the appearance of the target, by restricting
the output to be similar, patch by patch, to a collection of
(a) (b)
Figure 2. (a) The architecture of our network. For conditioning, a pre-trained face recognition network is used. (b) An illustration of the
multi-image perceptual loss used, which employs two replicas of the same face recognition network.
patches from the target person. Moreover, [23] is limited to
stills and was not demonstrated on video.
The face swapping (FS) project [8] is an unpublished
work that replaces faces in video in a way that can be very
convincing, given suitable inputs. Unlike our network, the
FS is retrained for every pair of source-video and target-
video persons. The inputs to the FS system, during training,
are two large sets of images, one from each identity. In
order to obtain good results, thousands of images from each
individual with a significant variability in pose, expression,
and illumination are typically used. In many cases, a large
subset of the images of the source person are taken from the
video that is going to be converted. In addition, FS often
fails, and in order to obtain a convincing output, the person
in the source video and the target person need to have a
similar facial structure. These limitations make it unsuitable
for de-identification purposes.
Like ours, the FS method is based on an encoder-decoder
architecture, where both an image and output mask are pro-
duced. A few technical novelties of FS are shared with our
work. Most notable is the way in which augmentation is
performed in order to train a more semantic encoder-decoder
network. During the training of FS, the input image is modi-
fied by rotating or scaling it, before it is fed to the encoder.
The image that the decoder outputs is compared to the undis-
torted image. Another common property is that the GAN
variant used employs virtual examples created using the
mixup technique [52]. In addition, in order to maintain the
pose and expression, which are considered low- or mid-level
features in face descriptors (orthogonal to the identity) FS
employs a perceptual loss [15, 47] that is based on the layers
of a face-recognition network.
Another line of work that manipulates faces in video is
face reanimation, e.g., [46]. This line of work reanimates the
face in the target video, as controlled by the face in a source
video. This does not provide a de-identification solution in
the sense that we discuss – the output video is reanimated
in a different scene, and not in the scene of the source video.
In addition, it always provides the same output identity.
We do not enforce disentanglement [14, 26, 5] between
the latent representation vector Z and the identity, since the
network receives the full information regarding the identity
using the face descriptor. Therefore, washing out the identity
information in Z may not be beneficial. Similarly, the U-Net
connection means that identity information can bypass Z.
In our method, the removal of identity is not done through
disentanglement but via the perceptual loss. As Fig. 9 demon-
strates, this loss provides a direct and quantifiable means for
controlling the amount of identity information. With dis-
entanglement, this effect would be brittle and sensitive to
hyperparameters, as is evident in work where the encod-
ing is set to be orthogonal, even to simple multiclass label
information, e.g, [25].
3. Method
Our architecture is based on an adversarial autoen-
coder [29], coupled with a trained face-classifier. By concate-
nating the autoencoder’s latent space with the face-classifier
representation layer, we achieve a rich latent space, embed-
ding both identity and expression information. The network
is trained in a counter-factual way, i.e., the output differs
from the input in key aspects, as dictated by the conditioning.
The generation task is, therefore, highly semantic, and the
loss required to capture its success cannot be a conventional
reconstruction loss.
For the task of de-identification, we employ a target im-
age, which is any image of the person in the video. The
method then distances the face descriptors of the output
video from those of the target image. The target image does
not need to be based on a frame from the input video. This
contributes to the applicability of the method, allowing it
to be applied to live videos. In our experiments, we do not
use an input frame in order to show the generality of the
approach. To encode the target image, we use a pre-trained
face classifier ResNet-50 network [12], trained over the VG-
GFace2 dataset [4].
The process during test time is similar to the steps taken in
the face swapping literature and involves the following steps:
(a) A square bounding box is extracted using the ’dlib’ [21]
face detector. (b) 68 facial points are detected using [18].
(c) A transformation matrix is extracted, using an estimated
similarity transformation (scale, rotation and translation) to
an averaged face. (d) The estimated transformation is applied
to the input face. (e) The transformed face is passed to our
network, together with the representation of the target image,
obtaining both an output image and a mask. (f) The output
image and mask are projected back, using the inverse of the
similarity transformation. (g) We generate an output frame
by linearly mixing, per pixel, the input and the network’s
transformed output image, according to the weights of the
transformed mask. (h) The outcome is merged into the
original frame, in the region defined by the convex hull of
the facial points.
At training time, we perform the following steps: (a) The
face image is distorted and augmented. This is done by
applying random scaling, rotation and elastic deformation.
(b) The distorted image is fed into the network, together with
the representation of a target image. During training, we
select the same image, undistorted. (c) A linear combination
of the masked output (computed as in step (g) above) and
the undistorted input is fed to the discriminator. This is
the mixup technique [52] discussed below. (d) Losses are
applied on the network’s mask and image output, as well as
to the masked output, as detailed below.
Note that there is a discrepancy between how the network
is trained and how it is applied. Not only do we not make
any explicit effort to train on videos, the target images are
selected in a different way. During training, we extract the
identity from the training image itself and not from an inde-
pendent target image. The method is still able to generalize
to perform the real task on unconstrained videos.
3.1. Network architecture
The architecture is illustrated in Fig. 2(a). The encoder is
composed of a convolutional layer, followed by five strided,
depth-wise separable [6] convolutions with instance normal-
ization [48]. Subsequently, a single fully connected layer
is employed, and the target face representation is concate-
nated. The decoder is composed of a fully connected layer,
followed by a lattice of upscale and residual [12] blocks,
terminated with a tanh activated convolution for the output
image, and a sigmoid activated convolution for the mask
output. Each upscale block is comprised of a 2D convolu-
tion, with twice the number of filters as the input channel
size. Following an instance normalization and a LReLU [11]
activation, the activations are re-ordered, so that the width
and height are doubled, while the channel size is halved.
Each residual block input is summed with the output of a
Conv2D-LReLU-Conv2D chain.
A low-capacity U-net connection [38] is employed
(32x32x1), thus relieving the autoencoder’s bottleneck, al-
lowing a stronger focus on the encoding of transfer-related
information. The connection size does not exceed the bottle-
neck size (1024) and due to the distortion of the input image,
a collapse into a simple reconstructing autoencoder in early
training stages is averted.
The discriminator consists of four strided convolutions
with LReLU activations, with instance normalization applied
on all but the first one. A sigmoid activated convolution
yields a single output.
The network has two versions: a lower resolution ver-
sion generating 128x128 images, and a higher resolution
version, generating 256x256 images. The higher resolution
decoder is simplified and enlarged and consists of a lattice
of 6x(Upscale block –> Residual block). Unless otherwise
specified, the results presented in the experiments are done
with the high-res model.
3.2. Training and the Losses Used
For training all networks, except for the discriminator
D, we use a compound loss L, which is a weighted sum of
multiple parts:
L =α0LG + α1LrawR + α1LmaskedR + α2Lrawx
+ α2Lrawy + α2Lmaskedx + α2Lmaskedy
+ α3Lrawp + α3Lmaskedp + α4Lm + α5Lmx + α5Lmy ,
where LG is the generator’s loss, LrawR and LmaskedR are
reconstruction losses for the output image of the decoder
zraw and the version after applying the masking zmasked,
L∗x and L∗y are reconstruction losses applied to the spatial
images derivatives, L∗p are the perceptual losses, and Lm∗
are regularization losses on the mask. The discriminator
network is trained using its own loss LD. Throughout our
experiments, we employ α0 = α1 = α2 = α3 = 0.5, α4 =
3 · 10−3, α5 = 10−2.
To maintain realistic looking generator outputs, an adver-
sarial loss is used with a convex combination of example
pairs (known as mixup) [52] over a Least Square GAN [30]:
LD = ‖D(δmx)− λβ1‖22
LG = α0‖D(δmx)− (1− λβ)1‖22
While, δmx = λβ · x+ (1− λβ)zmasked and λβ is sampled
out of a Beta distribution λβ ∼ Beta(α, α), x is the undis-
torted input “real” sample and zmasked is the post masking
generated sample. A value of α = 0.2 is used throughout
the experiments.
Additional losses are exercised to both retain source-
to-output similarity, yet drive a perceptible transformation.
Several losses are distributed equally between the raw and
masked outputs, imposing constraints on both. An L1 recon-
struction loss is used to enforce pixel-level similarity:
LrawR = α1‖zraw − x‖1 LmaskedR = α1‖zmasked − x‖1
where zraw is the output image itself. This results in a non-
trivial constraint, as the encoder input image is distorted. An
edge-preserving loss is used to constrain pixel-level deriva-
tive differences in both the x and y image axes. Calculated as
the absolute difference between the source and output deriva-
tives in each axis direction for both the raw and masked
outputs:
Lrawx = α2‖zrawx − xx‖1 Lmaskedx = α2‖zmaskedx − xx‖1
Lrawy = α2‖zrawy − xy‖1 Lmaskedy = α2‖zmaskedy − xy‖1
where xx is the derivative of the undistorted input image x
along the x axis, and similarly for outputs z and the y axis.
Additional losses are applied to the blending mask m,
where 0 indicates that the value of this pixel would be taken
from the input image x, 1 indicates taking the value from
zraw, and intermediate values indicate linear mixing. We
would like the mask to be both minimal and smooth and,
therefore, employ the following losses:
Lm = ‖m‖1 Lmx = ‖mx‖1 Lmy = ‖my‖1
where mx and my are the spatial derivatives of the mask.
3.2.1 A Multi-Image Perceptual Loss
A new variant of the perceptual loss [15] is employed to
maintain source expression, pose and lighting conditions,
while capturing the target identity essence. This is achieved
by employing a perceptual loss between the undistorted
source and generated output on several low-to-medium ab-
straction layers, while distancing the high abstraction layer
perceptual loss between the target and generated output.
Let arn×n be the activations of an n × n spatial block
within the face classifier network for image r, where in our
case, r can be either the input image x, the target image t,
the raw output zraw, or the masked output zmasked.
We consider the spatial activations maps of size 112 ×
112, 56×56, 28×28 and 7×7, as well as the representation
layer of size 1× 1. The lower layers (larger maps) are used
to enforce similarity to the input image x, while the 7 × 7
layer is used to enforce similarity to t, and the 1× 1 feature
vector is used to enforce dissimilarity to the target image.
Let us define `r1,r2n×n = cn‖ar1,n×n − ar2,n×n‖1, where
cn is a normalizing constant, corresponding to the size of the
spatial activation map.
Figure 3. Sample results for video de-identification (zoom). Triplets
of source frame, converted frame and target are shown. The modi-
fied frame looks similar but the identity is completely different.
The perceptual loss is given by:
Lcp = `x,z
c
112×112 + `
x,zc
56×56 + `
x,zc
28×28 + `
t,zc
7×7 − λ`t,z1×1
for c that is either raw or masked, and where λ > 0 is a
hyperparameter, which determines the generated face’s high
level features distance from those of the target image.
The application of the multi-image perceptual loss during
training is depicted in Fig. 2(b). During training, the target is
the source, and there is only one input image. The resulting
image has the texture, pose and expression of the source, but
the face is modified to distance the identity. Note that we
refer to it as a multi-image perceptual loss, as its aim is to
minimize the analog error term during inference (general-
ization error). However, as a training loss, it is only applied
during train, where it receives a pair of images, similar to
other perceptual losses.
Note that the perceptual loss parameters cn are normaliz-
ing constants obtained by counting the number of elements.
In addition, α0 = α1 = α2 = α3 are simply set to one, and
α4, α5 were chosen arbitrarily. Therefore, there is effectively,
only a single important hyperparameter: λ, which provides
a direct control of the strength of the identity distance which
requires tuning (see Fig. 9).
At inference time, the network is fed an input frame and
a target image. The target image is transmitted through the
face classifier, resulting in a target feature vector, which, in
turn, is concatenated to the latent embedding space. Due to
the way the network is trained, the decoder will drive the
output image away from the target feature vector.
Video lower higher
1 28.7% 34.2%
2 66.7% 45.8%
3 61.9% 64.3%
4 52.4% 62.1%
5 42.9% 43.8%
6 47.6% 27.0%
7 57.1% 56.8%
8 71.4% 73.5%
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Table 2. (a) Video user study - Success rate in user identification of a real video from a modified one for both lower-resolution and
higher-resolution models. Closer to 50% is better. (b) Each column is a different individual from the still image user study. [Row 1] The
gallery images, i.e, the album images the users were asked to select the identity from. [Row 2] The input images. [Row 3] The de-identified
version of [Row 2]. (c) The confusion matrix in identifying the five persons for the real images (control). (d) The confusion matrix for
identifying, based on the de-identified images.
RGB Face
Person in Method values desc.
Row 1 [41] 5.46 1.21
Our high 2.72 1.50
Row 2 [41] 4.91 1.35
Our high 2.35 1.53
Row 3 [41] 4.51 1.20
Our high 3.92 1.32
Table 3. The distance between the original and de-identified im-
age, for the images in Fig. 7. Our method results in lower pixel
differences but with face descriptor distances that are higher.
4. Experiments
Training is performed using the Adam [22] optimizer,
with the learning rate set to 10−4, β1 = 0.5, and β2 = 0.99.
At each training iteration, a batch of 32 images for the lower
resolution model, and 64 for the higher resolution model, are
randomly selected and augmented. We initialize all convo-
lutional weights using a random normal distribution, with
a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.02. Bias weights
are not used. The decoder includes LReLU activations with
α = 0.2 for residual blocks and α = 0.1 otherwise. The
low-resolution network was trained on a union of LFW [13],
CelebA [28] and PubFig [24], totaling 260,000 images, the
vast majority from CelebA. The identity information is not
used during training. The high-resolution network was train
on a union of CelebA-HQ [17], and faces extracted out of
the 1,000 source videos used by [39], resulting in 500,000
images. Training was more involved for the lower resolution
model, and it was trained for 230k iterations with a gradual
increasing strength of the hyperparameter λ, ranging from
λ = 1 · 10−7 to λ = 2 · 10−6, in four steps. Without this
gradual increase, the naturalness of the generated face is
diminished. For the higher resolution model, 80k iterations
with a fixed λ = 2 · 10−6 were sufficient.
Sample results are shown in Fig. 3. In each column, we
show the original frame, the modified (output) frame, and the
target image from which the identity was extracted. As can
be seen, our method produces natural looking images that
match the input frame. Identity is indeed modified, while the
other aspects of the frame are maintained.
The supplementary media (https://youtu.be/
cCYnBtni7Wg) contains sample videos, with significant
motion, pose, expression and illumination changes, to which
our method was applied. Our method can deal with videos,
without causing motion- or instability-based distortions.
This is despite being strictly based on per-frame analysis.
It is also evident that the lower resolution model seems
blurry at times. This is a consequence of the fixed resolu-
tion and not of the generated image, which is in fact sharp.
The higher resolution model clearly provides more pleasing
results, when the required resolution is high.
To test the naturalness of the approach, we tested the
ability of humans to discriminate between videos that were
modified to those that were not. Although the human ob-
servers (n = 20) were fully aware of the type of manip-
ulation that the videos had undergone, the human perfor-
mance was close to random, with an average success rate
of 53.6% (SD=13.0%), see Tab. 2(a). In order to avoid a
decision based on a familiar face, this was evaluated on a
non-celebrity dataset created specifically for this purpose,
which contained 8 videos.
Familiar identities, can often be recognized by non-facial
cues. To establish that given a similar context around a
facial identity (e.g. hair, gender, ethnicity), the perceived
identity is shifted in a way that is almost impossible to place,
we considered images of five persons of the same ethnicity
and similar hair styles from a TV show, and collected two
sets of images: reference (gallery) and source. The source
Original frames Lower-res de-ID model Higher-res de-ID
Person Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
±SD ±SD ±SD
Simone Biles 1 3 ±50 1730 2400.6±2142 1725 2223±1814
Billy Corgan 1 95.6±313 3156 3456.3±2601 901 1334±1518
Selena Gomez 1 1 ±0 2256 2704±1873 8058 8110±2186
Scarlett Johansson 1 3.8±38.6 9012 7753.5±3112 4493 4830±2544
Steven Yeun 1 1.02±0.6 5806 4976.2±3167 1069 1814±2544
Sarah J. Parker 1 1±0 679 1069.3±1096 408 620±665
Average 1 17 3773 3726 2776 3155
Table 4. Ranking of the true identity out of a dataset of 54,000 persons (SD=Standard Deviation). Evaluation is performed on the pre-trained
LResNet50E-IR ArcFace network. Results are given for both the lower- and higher-resolution models.
images were modified by our method, using them as targets
as well, see Tab. 2(b). As can be seen in the confusion
matrix of Tab. 2(c), the users could easily identify the correct
gallery images, based on the source images. However, as
Tab. 2(d) indicates, post de-identification, the answers had
little correlation with the true identity, as desired.
In order to automatically quantify the performance of our
de-identification method, we applied a state-of-the-art face-
recognition network, namely, the ArcFace [7] LResNet50E-
IR network. This network was selected both for its perfor-
mance, and for the dissimilarity between this network and
the VGGFace2 network, used as part of our network, in both
the training set and loss.
The results of the automatic identification are presented in
Tab. 4 for both the lower resolution and the higher resolution
models. Identification is performed out of the 54,000 persons
in the ArcFace verification set. The table reports the rank of
the true person out of all persons, when sorting the softmax
probabilities that the face recognition network produces. The
ranking of the true identity in the original video shows an
excellent recognition capability, with most of the frames
identifying the correct person as the top-1 result. For the
de-identified frames, despite the large similarity between
the original and the modified frames (Fig. 3), the rank is
typically in the thousands.
Another automatic face recognition experiment is con-
ducted on the LFW benchmark [13]. Tab. 5 presents the
results on de-identified LFW image pairs for a given person
(de-identification was applied to the second image of each
pair), for two FaceNet [42] models. The true positive rate
for the LFW benchmark drops from almost 0.99, to less than
0.04 after applying de-identification.
An additional experiment, evaluating our method on the
LFW benchmark, can be found in the appendix.
A comparison of our method with the recent work of [31]
is given in Fig. 4. This method relies on the generation of
a new identity, given the k-closest identities, as selected by
FaceNet Model Original De-ID
VGGFace2 0.986± 0.010 0.038± 0.015
CASIA 0.965± 0.016 0.035± 0.011
Table 5. Results on the LFW benchmark, employing the FaceNet
network trained on VGGFace2 or CASIA-WebFace. Shown is the
True Positive Rate for a False Acceptance Rate of 0.001.
a trained CNN feature-extractor. As can be seen, this can
result in the same rendered identities for multiple inputs, and
does not maintain the expression, illumination and skin tone.
To emphasize the ability of identity-distancing, while
maintaining pixel-space similarity, we compare our method
to [41]. While the method of [41] relies on finding a dis-
similar identity within a given dataset, ours is single-image
dependent, in the sense that it does not rely on other images
within a dataset. It is, therefore, resilient to different poses,
expressions, lighting conditions and face structures. Given
the figures provided in the work of [41], we compare our
generated outputs by high-level perceptual distance from
the source face, taking into account pixel-level similarity
(Fig. 7). A comparison of the distance between the original
and the de-identified image for the two methods (Tab. 3)
reveals that our method results in lower pixel differences,
yet with face descriptor distances that are higher.
A comparison with the work of [49] is given in Fig. 8. Our
results are at least as good as the original ones, despite having
to run on the cropped faces extracted from the paper PDF.
Although [49] presents visually pleasing results, they do
not maintain low-level and medium-level features, including
mouth expression and facial hair. In addition, the work
of [49] presents results on low-resolution black and white
images only, with no pose or gender variation.
Figure 5 compares with the recent work of [43, 44]. Our
method is able to distance the identity in a more subtle way,
while introducing less artifact. Our generated image contains
only the face, which is enabled by the use of the mask. Their
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4. (a) Input images
from [31], (b) our results, (c) those
of [31]. Our method maintains the
expression, pose, and illumination.
Furthermore, our work does not
assign the same new identity to
different persons.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5. (a) Input images
from [43, 44], (b) our results,
(c) those of [43] (row 1) and
[44] (rows 2-3).
method generates both the face and the upper body using
the same 256× 256 generation resolution, which makes our
results of a much higher effective resolution. A full set of
results is given in the appendix, Fig. 14.
To further demonstrate the robustness of our method, we
applied our technique to images copied directly from the
very difficult inputs of [36]. As can be seen in Fig. 6, our
method is robust to very challenging illuminations.
To demonstrate the control of the hyperparameter λ over
the identity distance, we provide a sequence of generated
images, where each trained model is identical, apart from
the strength of λ. The incremental shift in identity can be
seen in Fig. 9. Ablation analyses are given in the appendix.
The analyses compare various variants of our method, and
depict the artifacts introduced by removing parts of it.
5. Conclusions
Recent world events concerning the advances in, and
abuse of face recognition technology invoke the need
to understand methods that successfully deal with de-
identification. Our contribution is the only one suitable for
video, including live video, and presents quality that far sur-
passes the literature methods. The approach is both elegant
and markedly novel, employing an existing face descrip-
tor concatenated to the embedding space, a learned mask
for blending, a new type of perceptual loss for getting the
desired effect, among a few other contributions.
Minimally changing the image is important for the
method to be video-capable, and is also an important fac-
tor in the creation of adversarial examples [35]. Unlike
adversarial examples, in our work, this change is measured
using low- and mid-level features and not using norms on
the pixels themselves. It was recently shown that image per-
turbations caused by adversarial examples distort mid-level
features [50], which we constrain to remain unchanged.
Figure 6. De-Identification applied to the examples labeled as very
challenging in the NIST Face Recognition Challenge [36].
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 7. Comparison with [41] (from the paper sample image). (a)
Original image (also used for the target of our method). (b) Our
generated output. (c) Result of [41]. (d) Target used by [41].
Figure 8. Comparison with [49]. Row 1 - Original images. Row 2 -
results of [49]. Row 3 - Our generated outputs. The previous work
does not maintain mouth expression or facial hair.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 9. Incrementally growing λ in the lower resolution model.
A gradual identity shift can be observed. (a) Source. (b) λ =
−5 · 10−7. (c) λ = −1 · 10−6. (d) λ = −2 · 10−6.
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A. Ablation Analyses
A.1. General Ablation Analysis
An ablation analysis is shown in Fig. 12. In order to
efficiently run multiple-models, it is done with the low-res
architecture. The various options include: a no-mask option,
a partial adversarial loss that applies only to the masked
output and not to the raw output, training without the gradual
increase of λ, and an attempt to incorporate an additional
output with a lower resolution to be taken into account, as
part of the compound loss. All of these ablation experiments
were conducted on the lower-resolution model.
The following description of methods and the associated
artifacts correspond to the columns of Fig. 12: (c) No mask.
Bad face edge, glasses occlusion handled poorly. (d) Ad-
versarial loss on masked output only. Various artifacts, e.g.,
around the right eye, one can also observe green stripes near
Figure 10. No face-descriptor ablation study. Source (row 1), our
model (row 2), and no face-descriptor (row 3), resulting in lower
quality results, with noticeable artifacts in the rendered identity.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 11. Mask regularization ablation study and mask outputs.
(a) Source, (b) mask, (c) raw output, (d) masked output. Compared
to our model (row 1), the effects of not minimizing the mask norm
(α4 = 0, row 2) can be observed as occlusions (hand, pink ele-
ment, upper-left face) not handled well, and excessive face regions
taken from the rendered image, resulting in distortions. No mask
derivative regularization (α5 = 0, row 3) effects can be seen as
high-frequency patterns generated by the mask and output frame.
the mouth. (e) No gradual increment of λ. Collapse into
unnatural blurred face. (f) Lower resolution output added
for the compound loss. Weak de-id, checkerboard pattern
near the center of the face, and when handling occlusions.
(g) Weak λ, adversarial loss on masked output only. Weak
de-identification, artifacts near the eyes and eyebrows.
A numerical analysis plot of the ablation study with the
same options is provided in Fig. 13. Each method is evalu-
ated along two axes of comparison between the input image
and the output image: on the x-axis we show the difference
in appearance as measured by the L1 norm between the im-
ages; the y-axis shows the difference in ID, as computed by
the L1 norm between the VGGFace2 representation of the
two images. The plot shows mean results obtained for our
method (marked (b) to match the columns of Fig. 12) and the
various ablation methods (marked (c)–(g)). As can be seen,
our method maintains image similarity and also has a differ-
ence in ID that is similar or larger than any other method,
with the exception of the method marked as (c). This is
expected, since this variant is the mask-less one, which does
not blend-in the original image. Variant (f) is considerably
more similar to the original image on both axes, since the
de-ID performed is very weak with this variant.
A.2. Face-Descriptor Ablation Analysis
A face-descriptor-specific ablation analysis is provided
to emphasize its necessity in Fig. 10. The face-descriptor is
highly motivating for the decoder to use, otherwise, mini-
mizing the high-level perceptual loss (l1×1) would be more
challenging, as can be seen in Fig. 10. For each source image
(row 1), our model result (row 2) can be seen to produce
higher-quality results with less artifacts, compared to the
model that lacks a face-descriptor concatenated to the latent
space (row 3). In the results of the third row, the face descrip-
tor is not concatenated to the z embedding, but still used in
the perceptual loss.
A.3. Mask Regularization Ablation Analysis
The mask regularization parameters α4,5 importance can
be observed in Fig. 11. They assist in dealing with occlu-
sions, and handling irrelevant regions, that can be taken from
the source image, rather than generated (e.g. regions that
are not related to the generated face, teeth, etc.). α4 keeps
the mask minimal, i.e. blending maximal regions from the
source image, rather than the generated one. By avoiding
excessive blending of generated regions, less artifacts are
apparent on the final output (as observed in row 2). α4 keeps
the mask smooth, by penalizing mask derivatives. This can
be seen to reduce high-frequency patterns, (as observed in
row 3).
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Figure 12. An ablation study. (a) Source image. (b) Our result. (c)–(g) variants, see text for details.
Figure 13. The mean pixel-level distance vs. the mean ID distance. The first should be low, while the second should be high. Shown are the
methods of each column in Fig.12(b)–(g).
B. Additional Comparison with Previous Meth-
ods
We provide an extensive comparison with the work
of [44]. In the paper we only included one of [44] generated
outputs: the sample shown was the first output that gains
<50% of recognition rates by an automatic face recognition
algorithm, according to [44]. The work of [44] provides
several models for different levels of de-identification. In
Fig. 14, we present all faces from [44]. The reported recog-
nition rate itself is given in Tab. 6.
As can be seen in the results of [44], the less recognizable
the identity is, the less natural the face is. Note that: (1) our
model provides for much stronger de-identification results,
with the rank typically in the thousands, out of a dataset of
54,000 persons, as reported in the experiments section. (2)
all models of the baseline method produce low resolution
outputs (64 × 64) compared to our model’s much higher
resolution (256× 256).
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 14. A full set of results for the comparison with the work of [44]. (a) Source image, (b) our generated output, (c-h) generated outputs
for [44] of different models. The work of [44] provides several models that provide for different levels of de-identification. As can be seen,
models that gain a rate of < 50% of head obfuscation effectiveness by machine recognizers, provide less natural faces.
Row | Column (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Row 1 70.8% 47.6% 36.6% 18.0% 22.5% 7.1%
Row 2 59.9% 26.3% 25.8% 12.7% 15.7% 7.2%
Row 3 59.9% 26.3% 25.8% 12.7% 15.7% 7.2%
Table 6. Head obfuscation effectiveness for [44]: recognition rates of machine recognizers (lower is better), as provided by [44]
